Để sử dụng toàn bộ tiện ích nâng cao của Hệ Thống Pháp Luật vui lòng lựa chọn và đăng ký gói cước.
| BỘ XÂY DỰNG | CỘNG HÒA XÃ HỘI CHỦ NGHĨA VIỆT NAM |
| Số: 1050/QĐ-CHK | Hà Nội, ngày 15 tháng 7 năm 2025 |
QUYẾT ĐỊNH
VỀ VIỆC BAN HÀNH KẾ HOẠCH AN TOÀN HÀNG KHÔNG QUỐC GIA VIỆT NAM GIAI ĐOẠN 2025 - 2028 PHIÊN BẢN SỐ 01
CỤC TRƯỞNG CỤC HÀNG KHÔNG VIỆT NAM
Căn cứ Luật Hàng không dân dụng Việt Nam năm 2006 và Luật sửa đổi một số điều của Luật Hàng không dân dụng năm 2014;
Căn cứ Nghị định số 66/2015/NĐ-CP ngày 12/8/2015 của Chính phủ về Nhà chức trách hàng không;
Căn cứ Quyết định số 09/QĐ-BXD ngày 01/3/2025 của Bộ trưởng Bộ Xây dựng quy định chức năng, nhiệm vụ, quyền hạn và cơ cấu tổ chức của Cục Hàng không Việt Nam;
Căn cứ Quyết định số 1189/QĐ-BGTVT ngày 07/5/2013 của Bộ trưởng Bộ Giao thông vận tải phê duyệt Chương trình An toàn Quốc gia lĩnh vực hàng không dân dụng;
Theo đề nghị của Trưởng phòng Tiêu chuẩn an toàn bay,
QUYẾT ĐỊNH
Điều 1. Ban hành Kế hoạch an toàn hàng không quốc gia Việt Nam Giai đoạn 2025 - 2028 Phiên bản số 01 ở Phụ lục đính kèm.
Điều 2. Quyết định này có hiệu lực kể từ ngày ký.
Điều 3. Thủ trưởng các cơ quan, đơn vị có liên quan chịu trách nhiệm thi hành Quyết định này./.
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| KT. CỤC TRƯỞNG |
VIETNAM NATIONAL AVIATION SAFETY PLAN 2025 to 2028
FIRST EDITION
(Issued in accordance with Decision No. 1050/QĐ-TCATB dated /07/2025 by the Director General of the Civil Aviation Authority of Vietnam.)
Contents
Foreword
Acronyms
1.1 Overview of the NASP
1.2 Structure of the NASP
1.3 Relationship between the SSP and the NASP
1.4 Responsibility for the NASP development, implementation and monitoring
1.5 National safety issues, goals and targets
1.6 Operational context
SECTION 2. PURPOSE OF
VIETNAM’S NATIONAL AVIATION SAFETY PLAN
SECTION 3. VIETNAM’S STRATEGIC DIRECTION FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF AVIATION SAFETY
SECTION 4. NATIONAL OPERATIONAL SAFETY RISKS
SECTION 5. ORGANIZATIONAL CHALLENGES
SECTION 6. MONITORING IMPLEMENTATION 4
APPENDIX TO THE NASP
7.1 DETAILED SEIs: NATIONAL OPERATIONAL SAFETY RISKS
7.2 DETAILED SEIs: ORGANIZATIONAL CHALLENGES.
Foreword
Safety and passenger confidence in the air transport system are key objectives in Vietnamese Aviation Safety Policy. Commercial air transport is an important mode of transport in terms of global accessibility and the movement of people and goods. Furthermore, commercial air transport is experiencing rapid growth in Vietnam. The Vietnamese aviation industry provides direct and indirect employment to thousands of professionals, many of whom carry out tasks that impact the safety of air transport.
The National Aviation Safety Plan (NASP) is the master planning document containing the strategic direction of Vietnam for the management of aviation safety for a period of 4 years from 2025 to 2028. This plan lists national safety risks, stemming from operational and organisational issues which sets national aviation safety goals and targets, and presents a series of safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) to address identified safety deficiencies and achieve the national safety goals and targets.
The NASP has been developed combining international safety goals and targets and High-Risk Categories of Occurrences (HRCs) from both the GASP (www.icao.int/gasp) and the AP-RASP (www.icao.int/apac). These are highlighted in the text, where applicable. The SEIs listed in the NASP support the improvement of safety at the wider regional and international levels and include several actions to address specific safety risks and recommended SEIs for individual goals and targets. Vietnam has adopted these SEIs and has included them in this plan. Cross-references are provided to the GASP and AP-RASP for individual SEIs where relevant.
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| For Director General |
Acronyms
| ACV | Airport Corporation of Vietnam |
| ADR | Aerodromes |
| AIG | Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation |
| AIR | Airworthiness of Aircraft |
| AGA | Aerodrome and Ground Aids |
| AMO | Approved Maintenance Organisation |
| ANS | Air Navigation Services |
| AOC | Air Operator Certificate |
| AP-RASP | Asia Pacific - Regional Aviation Safety Plan |
| ASRMC | Aviation Safety Risk Manangement Committee |
| ATO | Approved Training Organisation |
| CAAV | Civil Aviation Authority of Vietnam |
| CE | Critical Element |
| EI | Effective Implementation |
| FDM | Flight Data Monitoring |
| FSSD | Flight Safety Standard Department |
| FRMS | Fatigue Risk Management System |
| GASP | Global Aviation Safety Plan |
| HRC | High-Risk Categories of Occurrences |
| ICAO | International Civil Aviation Organization |
| IFALPA | International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations |
| LEG | Primary Aviation Legislation & Specific Operating Regulations |
| MoC | Ministry of Construction |
| MOR | Mandatory Occurrence Report |
| NASP | National Aviation Safety Plan |
| ORG | Civil Aivation Organization |
| OPS | Aircraft Operations |
| PEL | Personnel Licensing and Training |
| RASG | Regional Aviation Safety Group |
| RASP | Regional Aviation Safety Plan |
| RPAS | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems |
| SEI | Safety Enhancement Initiative |
| SMS | Safety Management System |
| SPI | Safety Performance Indicator |
| SPT | Safety Performance Target |
| SSP | State Safety Programme |
| UAS | Unmanned Aircraft System |
| USOAP | ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme |
| VAR | Vietnam Aviation Regulations |
| VATM | Vietnam Air Traffic Management Corporation |
| VOR | Voluntary Occurrence Report |
SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview of the NASP
Vietnam is committed to enhancing aviation safety and to the resourcing of supporting activities. The purpose of this national aviation safety plan (NASP) is to continually reduce fatalities, and the risk of fatalities, through the development and implementation of a national aviation safety strategy. A safe, resilient and sustainable aviation system contributes to the economic development of Vietnam and its industries. The NASP promotes the effective implementation of Vietnam safety oversight system, a risk-based approach to managing safety, as well as a coordinated approach to collaboration between Vietnam and other States, regions and industry. All stakeholders are encouraged to support and implement the NASP as the strategy for the continuous improvement of aviation safety.
The NASP of Vietnam is in alignment with the ICAO Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP, Doc 10004) and the AP-RASP.
VIETNAM’s NATIONAL AVIATION SAFETY PLAN
Figure 1 Vietnam’s NASP
1.2 Structure of the NASP
This NASP presents the strategic direction for the management of aviation safety at the national level for a period of 4 years. It comprises six sections. In addition to the introduction, sections include: the purpose of the NASP, Vietnam strategic direction for the management of aviation safety, the national operational safety risks identified for the Vietnam’s NASP, organizational challenges addressed in the NASP, and a description of how the implementation of the safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) listed in the NASP is going to be monitored.
1.3 Relationship between the SSP and the NASP
This NASP addresses operational safety risks identified in the ICAO GASP and the AP-RASP in the absence of mature safety data analysis (SDA) aspects, as described in the ICAO State Safety Program Implementation Assessment (SSPIA) in Vietnam. Vietnam is committed to fully implement an SSP by 2026 as a state’s responsibilities for the management of safety comprise both safety oversight and safety management, collectively implemented through an SSP. Initiatives listed in this NASP address organisational challenges and aim to enhance organisational capabilities related to effective safety oversight.
1.4 Responsibility for the NASP development, implementation and monitoring
The Civil Aviation Authority of Vietnam (CAAV) is responsible for the development, implementation and monitoring of the NASP, in collaboration with entities below and with the national aviation industry. The NASP was developed in consultation with national operators and other key aviation stakeholders, and in alignment with the of the GASP and the AP-RASP.
Figure 2 Responsible of CAAV and Related Entities
1.5 National safety issues, goals and targets
The NASP addresses the following national safety issues:
Operational safety issue
1. Number of Accident/ Serious Incident is still significant relative to the size of aviation sector
Organizational safety issue
1. Low EI score (below 75%) in 2 area (LEG, AIG) and 4 CEs (CE-1, CE-2, CE- 5, CE-8).
2. Ineffective implementation of State Safety Program (SSP)
To address the issues listed above and enhance aviation safety at the national level, the Vietnam’s NASP contains the following goals and targets:
Figure 3 NASP Goals and Targets
The following 6 national high-risk categories of occurrences (HRCs) in the Vietnam context were considered of the utmost priority because of the number of fatalities and risk of fatalities associated with such events. They were identified based on analyses from mandatory and voluntary reporting systems, accident and incident investigation reports, safety oversight activities over the past 10 years, the SSP and on the operational safety risks described in the GASP and AP-RASP. These HRCs are in line with those listed in the 2023-2025 edition of the GASP, as well as the AP-RASP:
a. Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT).b. Loss of Control in Flight (LOC-I). c. Mid Air Collision (MAC). d. Runway Excursion (RE). e. Runway Incursion (RI). f. Birds and Wildlife Strikes (BIRD). |
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In addition to the national operational safety risks listed above, the following additional category of operational safety risks have been identified based on analyses from mandatory and voluntary reporting systems, accident and incident investigation reports, and safety oversight activities: Bird and wildlife strikes (BWI)
and RPAS activities has been identified as additional category of operational safety risks.
The aviation occurrence categories from the CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team (CICTT) were used to assess risk categories in the process of determining national operational safety risks. The CICTT Taxonomy is found on the ICAO website at https://www.icao.int/safety/airnavigation/AIG/Pages/Taxonomy.aspx.
To address the national operational safety risks listed above, Vietnam identified the following contributing factors leading to N-HRCs and will implement a series of SEIs, some of which are derived from the ICAO OPS roadmap, contained in the ICAO Global Aviation Safety Roadmap (Doc 10161):
HRC 1: Mitigate contributing factors to the risk of Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT).
Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) is an in-fight collision with terrain, water or obstacle without indication of loss of control. CFIT events are included in the VNASP due to the high risk of fatality.
| Examples of contributing factors | Examples of precusor events |
| ● ATS procedure design and documentation ● Pilot fatigue and disorientation ● ILS malfunction or calibration ● PAPI alignment with glideslope ● Crew resource management ● Adverse weather ● Obstacles not appropriately documented (charts) or marked (lighting) ● Loss of situational awareness ● Mountainous terrain ● Aircraft not equipped with TAWS/EGPWS ● Aircraft system malfunction (Navigation equipment and EGPWS) | ● Altitude below minimum safe altitude ● Flight path below glideslope during ILS approach ● Excessive rate of descent ● TAWS (EGPWS) warning ● Go-around at low altitude ● Inappropriate low altitude manoeuvring ● Low fuel ● Low energy during approach ● ILS failures and malfunctions |
HRC 2: Mitigate contributing factors to LOC-I accidents and incidents.
Loss of Control In-fight is an extreme deviation from intended flight path. Occurrences categorised as LOC-I are events that lead or could lead to a non- recoverable loss of control. LOC-I accidents often have catastrophic results with very high risk of fatality; for this reason, it is included in this VNASP.
| Examples of contributing factors | Examples of precusor events |
| ● Pilot performance as a result of Human Factors ● Inadequate flight crew training ● Operating procedure design ● ATS procedure design - SIDs & STARs ● Air trafc related such as wake turbulence ● Malfunctioining and/or misunderstanding of automation ● Aircraft system malfunction - Power plant, fight command ● Environment, including adverse weather conditions | ● System malfunction causing automation to disengage ● Aircraft not behaving as expected ● Wind shear event ● Stall warning and stick shaker events ● Excessive Bank angle |
HRC 3: Mitigate contributing factors to MAC accidents and incidents.
Mid-Air Collision refers to a collision between aircraft while both are airborne. There is also a high fatality risk associated with these events. Most occurrences reported relate to loss of separation and Trafc Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) Resolution Advisory (RA) warnings.
| Examples of contributing factors | Examples of precusor events |
| ● Air traffic controller’s workload and fatigue ● Communication errors between ATC and Pilot ● Released airborne objects such as sky lanterns, kites, firework, rocket and drones ● Flight crew training ● Aircraft system malfunction (TCAS, Altimeters) ● Congested airspace | ● Level busts ● TCAS RA ● Airspace infringements ● Loss of separation |
HRC 4: Mitigate contributing factors to RE accidents and incidents.
Runway Excursion is a veer off or overrun off the runway surface during both take- off and landing. This is the most prevalent occurrence related to “runway safety”. As opposed to previously described events, occurrences related to runway excursions have led, on average, to fewer fatalities. However, the reported occurrences relate to actual excursions rather than potential runway excursions so although the numbers are low the potential severity is high.
| Examples of contributing factors | Examples of precusor events |
| ● Heavy rain and/or strong winds ● Pilot error and decision making ● Runway conditions ● Unstabilised approach ● Aircraft system malfunction - Thrust reversers, speed-brakes & brakes | ● Unstabilised approach that continues to land ● Long landings ● Too high energy in final approach ● Aquaplaning events ● Aircraft stopping device failures - Thrust reversers,speed-brakes & brakes ● Rejected take-off ● Abnormal runway contact |
HRC 5: Mitigate contributing factors to RI accidents and incidents.
Runway Incursion is any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle, or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft. Although statistically very few runway incursions result in collisions, there is a high fatality risk associated with these events.
| Examples of contributing factors | Examples of precusor events |
| ● Airport signage, marking and lighting ● Communication errors (Pilot / ATC) ● ATC error ● Use of non-standard phraseology ● Loss of situational awareness ● Runway and taxiway layout ● Poor visibility due to adverse weather conditions ● High speed taxiing | ● Aircraft partially passing stop bars ● Runway/Taxiway confusion |
HRC 6: To reduce the rate of bird and Wildilfes strikes with damage to aircraft parts.
Bird strike is a collision between a bird and an aircraft. The majority of bird collisions occur near or at airports during take-off, landing, and associated phases of fight. Although most bird strikes do not result in signifcant events, the potential for an aircraft to lose both engines as a result of hitting flocks of large birds is real. The Vietnam ecosystem together with the number of bird strikes reported to CAAV demonstrate that bird strikes is a safety issue that needs to be addressed.
| Examples of contributing factors | Examples of precusor events |
| ● Birds inhabiting airport and surrounding areas ● Inadequate bird scaring activities ● Human settlements in the close proximity of the aerodromes ● Garbage dumpsites and landfills in close proximity to the aerodromes ● Migration of Birds across the runways of aerodromes ● Location of waterbodies in close proximity to aerodromes ● Presence of bird attractants within the airports like insects, food waste, water in abandoned projects. ● Abattoirs and fish drying activities in close proximity of the aerodromes | ● Large flocking birds sighted in close proximity to an aircraft |
The full list of the SEIs is presented in the appendix to the NASP.
1.6 Operational context
There are 22 certified aerodromes in Vietnam, including 10 international aerodromes. The airspace of Vietnam is classified into Class A, C, D, E and G. There were 7.980.186 movements in Vietnam over the period of 2013 to 2024. There are currently 13 air operator certificates (AOCs) issued by Vietnam, and of those there are 05 issued to operators conducting international commercial air transport operations. Vietnam also has 4 operators, which operate domestic and international air taxi services, 01 operator, which operate domestic flight, primarily on turboprop aircraft, as well as 02 helicopter operators. There are 02 heliports in Vietnam. Common challenges in Vietnam include among others are meteorology, topography, technology and environment.
Figure 4 Air Flow in Vietnam
SECTION 2. PURPOSE OF VIETNAM’S NATIONAL AVIATION SAFETY PLAN
The purpose of this National Aviation Safety Plan is to continually reduce fatalities, and the risk of fatalities, through the development and implementation of a national aviation safety strategy. A safe aviation system contributes to the economic development of Vietnam and its industries. The NASP promotes the effective implementation of Vietnam safety oversight system, a risk-based approach to managing safety, as well as a coordinated approach to collaboration between Vietnam and other States, regions and industry. All stakeholders are encouraged to support and implement the NASP as the strategy for the continuous improvement of aviation safety.
Strategically, NASP prioritize and streamline action in areas of aviation safety by addressing the currently identified high-risk categories (HRCs) of occurrences: controlled flight into terrain; loss of control in-flight; mid-air collisions; runway excursions; and runway incursions. SEIs in these areas contribute to the reduction of the national, regional and eventually global accident rate and the continuous reduction of fatalities.
The NASP also address identified deficiencies in state safety oversight capabilities and hence propose mitigating action through various SEIs to remedy, and improve Effective Implementation (EI) of audit areas and Critical Elements (CE) associated with it to achieve at the minimum the set target.
The NASP has been developed using international safety goals and targets and HRCs from both the GASP and the AP-RASP.
Figure 5 Purpose of Vietnam’s NASP
SECTION 3. VIETNAM’S STRATEGIC DIRECTION FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF AVIATION SAFETY
The NASP presents the SEIs that were developed based on the organizational challenges (ORG) and operational safety risks (OPS) roadmaps, as presented in the ICAO Global Aviation Safety Roadmap (Doc 10161), region-specific issues identified by AP- RASP as well as State-specific issues determined through SSP processes, including Vietnam’s hazard identification and safety risk management process and its SDCPS.
This plan is developed and maintained by Civil Aviation Authority of Vietnam, in coordination with the MoC and with key aviation.
The NASP includes the following national safety goals and targets for the management of aviation safety, as well as a series of indicators to monitor the progress made towards their achievement. They are tied to the goals, targets and indicators listed in the GASP and AP-RASP and include additional national safety goals, targets and indicators.
| Goal | Target | Indicators | Link to GASP and RASP |
| Goal 1 : Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks | 1.1 Maintain a decreasing trend of the national accident rate. | Number of accidents occurring per 100000 departures. Number of fatal accidents. Number of runway safety events | This goal is directly linked to Goal 1 and Target 1.1 of the GASP and linked to Goal I and Target 1 of the AP- RASP. |
| Goal 2 : Strengthen the State’s safety oversight capabilities | 2.1 To achieve an Effective Implementation (EI) for all Critical Elements (CE) under safety oversight as 75% by 2028 | Overall EI score Percentage of implemented Priority PQs Percentage of implemented PQs Percentage of completed CAPs for areas such as LEG, ORG, AGA, ANS and AIG, OPS, AIR, PEL (using OLF) | This goal is directly linked to Goal 2 and Target 2.1 of the GASP and linked to Goal II and Target 10 of the AP- RASP. |
| Goal 3 : Implementation an effective State Safety Programme (SSP) | 3.1 To implement the foundation of an SSP by 2026 | Percentage of satisfactory implementation of SSP foundational PQs Percentage of required CAPs related to the SSP foundational PQs submitted (using OLF) Percentage of required CAPs related to the SSP foundational PQs completed (using OLF) Number of applicable service providers implement an SMS | This goal is directly linked to Goal 3 and Target 3.1 and 3.2 of the GASP and linked to Goal III and Target 3.1 and 3.2 of the AP-RASP |
| 3.2 To fully implement an effective SSP by 2028 | Level of implementation achieved through SSP Gap Analysis (iSTARS) Implementation of an effective SSP |
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The SEIs in this plan are implemented through Vietnam’s existing safety oversight capabilities and the service providers’ safety management systems (SMS). SEIs derived from the ICAO Global Aviation Safety Roadmap (Doc 10161) were identified to achieve the national safety goals presented in the NASP. Some of the national SEIs are linked to overarching SEIs at the regional and international levels and help to enhance aviation safety globally. The full list of the SEIs is presented in the appendix to this NASP.
The NASP also addresses emerging issues, which include concepts of operations, technologies, public policies, business models or ideas that might impact safety in the future, for which insufficient data exists to complete a typical data-driven analysis. Due to the lack of data, emerging issues cannot automatically be considered as operational safety risks. It is important that Vietnam remain vigilant on emerging issues to identify hazards and safety deficiencies, collect relevant data and proactively develop mitigations to address any associated risks. The NASP addresses the following emerging issues, which were identified by CAAV for further analysis:
a. Drones operating in the vicinity of aerodromes
b. Laser attacks on aircraft approaching for landing
c. FOD with damage aircraft parts
SECTION 4. NATIONAL OPERATIONAL SAFETY RISKS
The NASP includes SEIs that address national operational safety risks, derived from lessons learned from occurrences and from a data-driven approach. These SEIs may include actions such as rule-making, policy development, targeted safety oversight activities, safety data analysis and safety promotion. Separate sections are provided to address commercial air transport and general aviation to make the information more accessible to stakeholders.
CAAV publishes an Annual Safety Report, available on the CAAV website: www.caa.gov.vn. The summary of accidents and serious incidents that occurred in Vietnam, and those for aircraft registered in Vietnam involved in commercial air transport and aircraft involved in general aviation, is shown in the tables below.
| Year | Fatal Accidents | None Fatal Accidents | Serious Incidents |
| Commercial air transport occurrences in Vietnam | |||
| 2013-2018 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| 2019 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 2020 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| 2021 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2022 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2023 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2024 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| General aviation aircraft occurrences in Vietnam | |||
| 2013-2018 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 2019 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2020 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2021 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2022 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| 2023 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| 2024 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Year | Fatal Accidents | None Fatal Accidents | Serious Incidents |
| Occurrences involving commercial air transport aircraft registered in Vietnam | |||
| 2013-2018 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| 2019 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 2020 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| 2021 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2022 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2023 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2024 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Occurrences involving general aviation aircraft registered in Vietnam | |||
| 2013-2018 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 2019 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2020 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2021 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2022 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| 2023 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| 2024 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
SECTION 5. ORGANIZATIONAL CHALLENGES
In addition to the national operational safety risks listed in the NASP, Vietnam has identified organizational challenges and a series of SEIs, selected for the NASP, to address them. These are given priority in the NASP since they are aimed at enhancing and strengthening Vietnam’s safety oversight capabilities and the management of aviation safety at the national level.
The eight critical elements of a safety oversight system are defined by ICAO. is committed to the effective implementation of these eight CEs, as part of its overall safety oversight responsibilities, which emphasize Vietnam’s commitment to safety in respect of its aviation activities. The eight CEs are presented in Figure 6 below. The latest ICAO activities, which aim to measure the effective implementation of the eight CEs of Vietnam’s safety oversight system, as part of the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP), have resulted in the following scores:
Figure 6 Critical elements of a State’s safety oversight system
| Overall, EI score | |||||||
| 78.1 % | |||||||
| EI score by CE | |||||||
| CE-1 | CE-2 | CE-3 | CE-4 | CE-5 | CE-6 | CE-7 | CE-8 |
| 58.62 % | 65.93 % | 80.65 % | 90.91 % | 66.67 % | 87.63 % | 88.12 % | 64.29 % |
| EI score by audit area | |||||||
| LEG | ORG | PEL | OPS | AIR | AIG | ANS | AGA |
| 71.43 % | 81.82 % | 85.88 % | 85.71 % | 79.25 % | 30.12 % | 91.8 % | 83.85 % |
The following 03 organizational challenges in the context were considered of the utmost priority because they impact the effectiveness of safety risk controls. They were identified based on analysis from USOAP data, accident and incident investigation reports, safety oversight activities over the past 10 years, the SSP, as well as on the basis of regional analysis conducted by RASG-APAC.
These issues are typically systemic in nature and relate to challenges associated with the conduct of States’ safety oversight functions, implementation of SSP at the national level and the level of SMS implementation by national service providers. They take into consideration organizational culture, policies and procedures within CAAV and those of service providers. These organizational challenges are in line with those listed in the of the GASP, as well as the AP-RASP :
a. Low EI score in 2 area (AIG and LEG) and low EI score under 4 CEs (CE1, CE2, CE5 and CE8).
b. Vietnam has an overall SSP foundation of only 83.19%.
c. Ineffective implementation of State Safety Programme (SSP)
To address the organizational challenges listed above, Vietnam will implement a series of SEIs, some of which are derived from the ICAO ORG roadmap, contained in the ICAO Global Aviation Safety Roadmap (Doc 10161). The full list of the SEIs is presented in the appendix to the NASP.
SECTION 6. MONITORING IMPLEMENTATION
CAAV will continuously monitor the implementation of the SEIs listed in the NASP and measure safety performance of the national civil aviation system to ensure the intended results are achieved, using the mechanisms presented in the appendix to this plan.
In addition to the above, CAAV will review the NASP every two years or earlier, if required, to keep the identified operational safety risks, organizational challenges and selected SEIs updated and relevant. The CAAV will periodically review the safety performance of the initiatives listed in the NASP to ensure the achievement of national safety goals. If required, CAAV will seek the support of the RASG-APAC and the Vietnamese aviation industries to ensure the timely implementation of SEIs to address national safety issues. Through close monitoring of the SEIs, CAAV will make adjustments to the NASP and its initiatives, if needed, and update the NASP accordingly.
CAAV will use the indicators listed in Section 3 of this plan to measure safety performance of the national civil aviation system and monitor each national safety target. A periodic safety report will be published to provide stakeholders with relevant up-to-date information on the progress made in achieving the national safety goals, as well as the implementation status of the SEIs.
In the event that the national safety goals are not met, the root causes will be presented. If Vietnam identifies critical operational safety risks, reasonable measures will be taken to mitigate them as soon as practicable, possibly leading to an unscheduled revision of the NASP.
Vietnam adopted a standardized approach to provide information at the regional level and to report to the regional aviation safety group (RASG-APAC).
This allows the region to receive information and assess operational safety risks using common methodologies.
Any questions regarding the NASP and its initiatives, and further requests for information, may be addressed to the following:
Civil Aviation Authority of Vietnam
Address :119 Nguyen Son Str, Bo De Ward
Hanoi City, Vietnam 10000.
Email : asica@caa.gov.vn
APPENDIX TO THE NASP
7.1 DETAILED SEIs: NATIONAL OPERATIONAL SAFETY RISKS
| N-HRC 1: Operational Safety Risks - Significant number of accident/serious incident | |||||||
| Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks | |||||||
| Target 1.1: Maintain a decreasing trend of the national accident rate | |||||||
| Safety enhancement initiative | Action | Timeline | Responsible entity | Stakeholders | Metrics | Priority | Monitoring activity |
| SEI-1.1.1 (CFIT) Mitigate contributing factors to the risk of CFIT GASP HRC-1 | a. Ensure aircraft are equipped with Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) in accordance with Annex 6 | 2025 | CAAV (AIR) | AOC AMO ATO | Number of GPWS equipped aircraft | High | Oversight activity inspection / surveillance |
| b. Promote the wider use of GPWS beyond the requirements of Annex 6 | 2025 | CAAV (AIR, OPS) | AOC ATO | Advisory Circular | Med | Advisory Circulars development and publication Continuous engagement with stakeholders | |
| c. Issue a Safety Advisory to increase adherence to GPWS warning procedures | 2025 | CAAV (AIR, OPS) AOC | AOC ATO | Advisory Circular | Med | Advisory Circulars development and publication | |
| d. Promote greater awareness of approach risks | On-going | CAAV (AIR, OPS, ANS, AGA) | AOC ATO VATM ACV VNAIC | Advisory Circular | Med | Advisory Circulars development and publication Continuous engagement with stakeholders | |
| e. Consider the implementation of continuous descent final approaches (CDFA) | 2028 | CAAV (AIR, OPS, ANS) | AOC ATO VATM VNAIC | Advisory Circular | Med | Advisory Circulars development and publication Continuous engagement with stakeholders | |
| f. Consider the implementation of minimum safe altitude warning (MSAW) systems | 2028 | CAAV (AIR, OPS, ANS) | AOC ATO VATM VNAIC | Advisory Circular | Med | Advisory Circulars development and publication Continuous engagement with stakeholders | |
| g. Promote the use of GPS-derived position data to feed GPWS | On-going | CAAV (AIR, OPS, ANS, AGA) | VATM ACV AOC ATO | Advisory Circular | Med | Advisory Circulars development and publication | |
| h. Validate the effectiveness of the SEIs through the analysis of MORs and VORs and accident/incident investigations | On-going | CAAV (AGA, ANS, AIR, OPS, AIG) | AOC ATO VATM ACV | Number of accidents per 100,000 departures (accident rate) Number of fatal accidents Number of runway safety events | High | Analysis of MORs, VORs and accident/ incident investigation | |
| j. Identify additional contributing factors, for example: •Flight in adverse environmental conditions •Inaccurate approach design and inadequate documentation •Phraseology used •Pilot fatigue and disorientation | On-going | CAAV (AGA, ANS, AIR, OPS, AIG) | AOC ATO VATM ACV VNAIC | ||||
| SEI-1.1.2 (LOC-I) Mitigate contributing factors to LOC-I accidents and incidents GASP HRC-2 | a. Require upset prevention and recovery training in all full flight simulator type conversion and recurrent training programmes | 2025 | CAAV (OPS, PEL) | AOC ATO | Number of AOC/ATO incorporating UPRT training | High | Advisory Circulars development and publication Oversight of airline and ATO training activities |
| b. Ensure that the pilot trainings extensively incorporate human factors such as distraction, complacency, situational awareness etc | 2025 | CAAV (OPS, PEL) | AOC ATO | Number of AOC/ATO incorporating human factors training | High | Advisory Circulars development and publication Oversight of airline and ATO training activities | |
| c. Validate the effectiveness of the SEIs through the analysis of MORs and VORs and accident/incident investigations | On-going | CAAV (AGA, ANS, AIR, OPS, AIG) | AOC ATO VATM ACV | Number of accidents per 100,000 departures (accident rate) Number of fatal accidents Number of runway safety events | High | Analysis of MORs, VORs and accident/ incident investigation | |
| d. Evaluate the existing SOPs to insure the effective flight management during adverse weather and recovery of unusual aircraft attitudes. | 2025 | CAAV (ANS, OPS) AOC ATO | AOC ATO | Number of AOC/ATO incorporating effective flight management during adverse weather and recovery of unusual aircraft attitudes in SOP | High | Oversight of airline and ATO training activities | |
| e. Identify additional contributing factors, for example: • Adverse weather • Insufficient height above terrain for recovery | On-going | CAAV (AGA, ANS, AIR, OPS, AIG) | AOC ATO VATM ACV | Number of accidents per 100,000 departures (accident rate) Number of fatal accidents | Med | Analysis of MORs, VORs and accident/ incident investigation | |
| SEI-1.1.3 (MAC) Mitigate contributing factors to MAC accidents and incidents GASP HRC-3 | a. Establish guidance and regulations to ensure aircraft required to be equipped are equipped with airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS), in accordance with Annex 6. | 2025 | CAAV (AIR) | AOC AMO ATO | Number of ACAS equipped aircraft Regulations and Advisory Circulars | High | Regulation and advisory circulars development and publication Oversight activity inspection / surveillance |
| b. Ensure adherence to ACAS warning procedures. | On-going | CAAV (AIR, OPS, ANS) | AOC ATO VATM VNAIC | Advisory Circular | High | Advisory Circulars development and publication Oversight of airline and ATO training activities | |
| c. Promote the improvement of air traffic control (ATC) systems, procedures and tools to enhance conflict management. | On-going | CAAV (ANS) | AOC ATO VATM VNAIC | Advisory Circular | Med | Advisory Circulars development and publication Continuous engagement with stakeholders | |
| d. Promote the improvement of communications systems and procedures, such as controller-pilot datalink | On-going | CAAV (ANS, AIR, OPS) | AOC ATO VATM VNAIC | Advisory Circular | Med | Advisory Circulars development and publication Continuous engagement with stakeholders | |
| e. Validate the effectiveness of the SEIs through the analysis of MORs and VORs and accident/incident investigations. | On-going | CAAV (ANS, AIR, OPS, AIG) | AOC ATO VATM VNAIC | Number of accidents per 100,000 departures (accident rate) Number of fatal accidents | High | Analysis of MORs, VORs and accident/ incident investigation | |
| SEI-1.1.4 (RE) Mitigate contributing factors to RE accidents and incidents GASP HRC- 4 | a. Ensure the establishment and implementation of a State runway safety programme and runway safety teams | 2026 | CAAV (LEG, ORG, AGA, OPS, AIG) | AOC ATO ACV | State runway safety programme | High | Development and publication of the State runway safety programme Runway safety team |
| b. Promote the establishment of policy and training on rejected landings, go- arounds, crosswind and tailwind landings (up to the maximum manufacturer- demonstrated winds) | On-going | CAAV ( OPS, PEL) | AOC ATO | Advisory Circulars | High | Advisory Circulars development and publication Continuous engagement with stakeholders | |
| c. Promote flight crew of runway overrun awareness and alerting systems on aircraft | On-going | CAAV (OPS) | AOC ATO | Advisory Circulars | High | Advisory Circulars development and publication Continuous engagement with stakeholders | |
| d. Ensure effective and timely reporting of meteorological and aerodrome conditions (e.g. runway surface condition in accordance to the ICAO global reporting format in Annex 14, Volume I, braking action and revised declared distances) | 2025 | CAAV (AGA) | ACV VNAIC | Reporting system of meteorological and aerodrome conditions | High | Oversight | |
| e. Certify aerodrome in accordance with ICAO Annex 14, Volume I as well as Doc 9981, PANS-Aerodrome | On-going | CAAV (AGA) | ACV | Regulations | High | Certification / Oversight | |
| f. Promote the installation of arresting systems if runway end safety area (RESA) requirements cannot be met | On-going | CAAV (AGA) | ACV | Advisory Circulars | High |
| |
| g. Ensure that procedures to systematically reduce the rate of unstabilized approaches to runways are developed and used | 2025 | CAAV (OPS) | AOC ATO | Procedures development and publication | High | Oversight of airline and ATO | |
| h. Validate the effectiveness of the SEIs through the analysis of MORs and VORs and accident/incident investigations. | On-going | CAAV (AGA, AIG) | AOC ATO ACV | Number of accidents per 100,000 departures (accident rate) Number of fatal accidents Number of runway safety events | High | Analysis of MORs, VORs and accident/ incident investigation | |
| SEI-1.1.5 (RI) Mitigate contributing factors to RI accidents and incidents GASP HRC- 5 | a. Ensure establishment and implementation of National Runway Safety Programme (NRSP) and Runway Safety Teams (RST) | 2026 | CAAV (LEG, ORG, AGA, OPS, AIG) | AOC ATO ACV | State runway safety programme | High | Development and publication of the State runway safety programme Runway safety team |
| b. Promote the establishment of policy, procedures and training that supports situational awareness for controllers, pilots and airside vehicle drivers | 2025 | CAAV (OPS, PEL, AGA) | AOC ATO ACV | Advisory Circulars | High | Advisory Circulars development and publication Continuous engagement with stakeholders | |
| c. Ensure effective use of suitable technologies to assist the improvement of situation awareness, such as improved resolution airport moving maps (AMM), electronic flight bags (EFBs), enhanced vision systems (EVS) and head-up displays (HUD), advanced-surface movement guidance and control systems (A- SMGCS), stop bars and runway incursion warning systems (ARIWS) | 2028 | CAAV (OPS, AGA) | AOC ATO ACV | Procedures Training | High | Oversight of AOC, ATO and aerodromes | |
| d. Ensure the use of standard phraseologies in accordance with applicable State regulations and ICAO provisions (e.g. Doc 9432, Manual of Radiotelephony) | 2025 | CAAV (OPS, AGA) | AOC ATO ACV | Procedures Training | High | Oversight of AOC, ATO and aerodromes | |
| f. Ensure the identification and publication in the aeronautical information publication (AIP) of hot spots at aerodromes | 2025 | CAAV (AGA) | ACV VNAIC | AIP |
| Development and publication of AIP | |
| g. Ensure that suitable strategies to remove hazards or mitigate risks associated with identified hot spots are developed and executed |
| CAAV (AGA) | ACV AOC ATO AMO |
|
|
| |
| h. Validate the effectiveness of the SEIs through the analysis of MORs and VORs and accident/incident investigations. |
| CAAV (AGA, AIG, OPS) | AOC ATO ACV | Number of accidents per 100,000 departures (accident rate) Number of fatal accidents Number of runway safety events |
| Analysis of MORs, VORs and accident/ incident investigation | |
| SEI - 1.1.6 (BIRD) Mitigate contributing factors to bird/wildlife strikes HRC-6 | a. Ensure the establishment and implementation of a National Wildlife Hazard management committee and programme. | 2025 | CAAV (LEG, ORG, AGA, OPS, AIG) | AOC ATO ACV | Approved National Wildlife Hazard Management Plan letters of appointment to the National Wildlife Hazard Committee | High | Oversight of the Aerodromes |
| b. Ensure the establishment and implementation of Local Wildlife Hazard management committees at all Certified aerodromes. | 2025 | CAAV (LEG, ORG, AGA, OPS, AIG) | AOC ATO ACV | Number of meetings held | High | Oversight of the Aerodromes | |
| c. Development and implementation of wildlife hazard management plan at certified aerodromes. | 2026 | CAAV (AGA) | ACV | Number of airports that have developed wildlife hazard management plans percentage of wildlife plan implemented | High | Oversight of the Aerodromes | |
| d. Ensure the collection, analysis and reporting of bird hazard and bird strikes data is undertaken. | On-going | CAAV (AGA, ANS, AIR, OPS, AIG) | AOC ATO AMO ACV VATM | Number of birdstrikes per aerodrome per year | High | Oversight of the Stakeholders | |
| e. Ensure better management of vegetation and land use around airports | On-going | CAAV (AGA) | ACV local authorities | Number of bird strikes per aerodrome per year | Med | Surveillance audits and inspection s of the Aerodromes | |
| f. Validate the effectiveness of the SEIs through the analysis of Birdstrike data and reports fromstakeholders | On-going | CAAV (AGA, AIG, OPS, AIR) | AOC ATO AMO ACV VATM | Number of accidents per 100,000 departures (accident rate) Number of fatal accidents Number of bird strikes per aerodrome per year | High | Analysis of MORs, VORs and accident/ incident investigation | |
7.2 DETAILED SEIs: ORGANIZATIONAL CHALLENGES.
| Organizational challenge : Deficiency in Safety Oversight System | ||||||||||
| Goal 2: Strengthen the Vietnam’s safety oversight capabilities | ||||||||||
| Target 2.1 : To improve score for the Effective Implementation (EI) of all Critical Elements (CEs) of the Safety Oversight System as 75% by 2028 | ||||||||||
| Safety enhancement initiative | Action | Timeline | Responsible entity | Stakeholders | Metrics | Priority | Monitoring activity | |||
| SEI-2.1.1 Consistent implementation of and compliance with ICAO SARPs at the national level (GASP SEI-1 & SEI-8) | a. Establish primary aviation law and regulations, to empower the competent authority to conduct regulatory oversight (GASP, SEI-1C) | 2026 | CAAV (LEG, ORG, AGA, ANS, AIR, OPS, PEL, AIG) | CAAV - All regulatory Department | Primary Legislation Regulations | High | Periodic review by CAAV Management (ASRMC) until completion | |||
| b. Increase level of compliance with ICAO SARPs and the EI of CEs with emphasis on:
| 2026 2028 | CAAV (LEG, ORG, AGA, ANS, AIR, OPS, PEL, AIG) | ICAO USOAP CMA OLF updated regularly a. CAPs b. State Aviation Activity Questionnaire (SAAQ) c. CC/EFOD | High | ||||||
| SEI-2.1.2 Establishment of an independent regional accident and incident investigation process, consistent with Annex 13 - Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation (GASP SEI-3) | a - Establish an independent accident and incident investigation authority, as per Annex 13 requirements (CE-1 and CE-3) (GASP, SEI- 3A) | 2026 | MOC/CAAV (LEG, ORG, AIG) | CAAV/ FSSD and Legal Department |
| High | ||||
| b - Develop an effective system to promulgate technical guidance and tools, and provide safety-critical information needed for technical personnel to effectively conduct accident and incident investigations (CE-5) (GASP, SEI-3B) | 2028 | CAAV (LEG, ORG, AIG) | ||||||||
| c - Establish an effective system to attract, recruit, train and retain qualified and sufficient technical personnel to support accident and incident investigations (CE-3 and CE-4) (GASP, SEI-3C) | 2026 | CAAV (LEG, ORG, AIG) | ||||||||
| SEI-2.1.3 Development of comprehensive regulatory oversight framework (GASP, SEI-2) | a. Develop an effective system to promulgate technical guidance and tools and provide safety critical information needed for technical personnel to effectively perform their safety oversight functions (GASP, SEI-2B) | 2026 | CAAV (LEG, ORG, AGA, ANS, AIR, OPS, PEL) | CAAV - All regulatory Department | Chart showing an effective organisation structure Number of VARs, ACs and MOSs, MAAs issued Number of guidance materials | High | Perodic review by CAAV Management (ASRMC) until completion | |||
| b. Establish an effective system to attract, recruit, train and retain qualified and sufficient technical personnel to support regulatory oversight | 2028 | CAAV (LEG, ORG, AGA, ANS, AIR, OPS, PEL) | CAAV - All regulatory Department | - Assessment and revise as required of current recruitment system and HR policy; - umber/percentage of inspectors recruited after the assessment and assessment of recruitment system and HR policy; - Number of training sessions on safety inspector/oversight - Number / percentage of personnel completing safety inspector/oversight training - Number/ percentage of inspectors retained more than 12 months after recruitment | High | |||||
| Organizational challenge : Ineffective State Safety Programme Implementation | ||||||||||
| Goal 3: Establish and Manage the State Safety Programme | ||||||||||
| Target 3.1 : To effectively implement the foundation of an SSP by 2026 Target 3.2: To fully implement an effective SSP by 2028 | ||||||||||
| Safety enhancement initiative | Action | Timeline | Responsible entity | Stakeholders | Metrics | Priority | Monitoring activity | |||
| SEI-3.1 Start of updated SSP implementation at the national level (GASP, SEI- 13) | a. Secure State-level commitment to improve safety (GASP, SEI-13A) b. Conduct update SSP gap analysis (checklist) then the detailed SSP self- assessment (GASP, SEI-13B) c. Establish an SSP implementation team (GASP, SEI-13C) d. Develop an implementation plan for the SSP (GASP, SEI-13D) e. Update SMS regulations for service providers and verify SMS implementation through SMS audit (GASP, SEI-13E) | 2026 | CAAV (LEG, ORG, AGA, ANS, AIR, OPS, PEL, AIG) | AOC AMO ATO ACV VATM | Percentage of satisfactory implementation of SSP foundation PQs Percentage of required CAPs related to the SSP foundation PQs submitted (using OLF) Percentage of required CAPs related to the SSP foundation PQs completed (using OLF) Number of applicable service providers implement an SMS | High | Periodic review by Aviation Safety Risk Manangement Committee (ASRMC) | |||
| SEI-3.2 Strategic allocation of resources to start SSP implementation (GASP, SEI-14) | a. Establish a process for planning and allocation of resources to enable SSP implementation and identify areas where resources are needed (GASP, SEI-14A) | 2026
| CAAV (LEG, ORG, AGA, ANS, AIR, OPS, PEL, AIG) | AOC AMO ATO ACV VATM | Percentage of satisfactory implementation of SSP foundation PQs Percentage of required CAPs related to the SSP foundation PQs submitted (using OLF) Percentage of required CAPs related to the SSP foundation PQs submitted (using OLF) | High | Periodic review by Aviation Safety Risk Manangement Committee (ASRMC) | |||
|
b. Collaborate with national and appropriate authorities’ leadership and stakeholders within the State to support SSP implementation (GASP, SEI-14B) c. Collaborate with ICAO Regional Office, other States and other organizations, as appropriate to train qualified technical personnel to fulfil their duties and responsibilities regarding SSP implementation (GASP, SEI-14D) | 2026 | MOC/CAAV (LEG, ORG, AGA, ANS, AIR, OPS, PEL, AIG) | ||||||||
| 2026 | CAAV (LEG, ORG, AGA, ANS, AIR, OPS, PEL, AIG) |
| ||||||||
| SEI-3.3 Strategic collaboration with key aviation stakeholders to start SSP implementation (GASP, SEI-15) | a. Develop an action plan to address the elements identified as missing or deficient during the SSP Gap analysis (SEI-15C). b. Develop a process to provide training on SSP to relevant staff, in collaboration with Regional Office and/or other States (e.g. initial, recurrent and advanced) (SEI-15E). | 2026 | CAAV (LEG, ORG, AGA, ANS, AIR, OPS, PEL, AIG) | AOC AMO ATO ACV VATM | Percentage of satisfactory implementation of SSP foundation PQs Percentage of required CAPs related to the SSP foundation PQs submitted (using OLF) Percentage of required CAPs related to the SSP foundation PQs completed (using OLF) Level of implementation achieved through SSP Gap Analysis (iSTARS) | High | Periodic review by Aviation Safety Risk Manangement Committee (ASRMC) | |||
| SEI-3.5 Availability of safety data and safety information to support safety management at the national level (Phase 1) (GASP, SEI- 17) | a. Establish a legal framework related to the protection of safety data, safety information and other related sources (GASP, SEI-17A) | 2026 | CAAV (LEG, ORG, AGA, ANS, AIR, OPS, PEL, AIG) | AOC AMO ATO ACV VATM | Level of implementation achieved through SSP Gap Analysis (iSTARS) Establishment of legal provision for protection of safety data Establishment of MOR and VOR system Establishment of safety database Establishment of process for Hazard identification | High | Periodic review by Aviation Safety Risk Manangement Committee (ASRMC) | |||
| b. Establish a State mandatory occurrence reporting system (GASP, SEI- 17B) | 2025 | |||||||||
| c. Establish safety data collection and processing systems (SDCPS) to capture, store, aggregate and enable the analysis of safety data and safety information to support their safety performance management activities (GASP, SEI-17C) | 2026 | |||||||||
| d. Establish and maintain a process to identify hazards from collected safety data (GASP, SEI-17D) | 2026 | |||||||||
| e. Establish and utilize a process to ensure the assessment of safety risks associated with identified hazards (GASP, SEI-17E) | 2026 | |||||||||
| f. Establish a State confidential voluntary safety reporting system providing data to the safety database (GASP, SEI-17F) | 202 | |||||||||
| SEI-3.6 Availability of safety data and safety information to support safety management activities at the national level ( (Phase 2) (GASP, SEI- 18) | a. Develop the safety objectives to be achieved through the SSP (GASP, SEI-18A) | 2026 | CAAV (LEG, ORG, AGA, ANS, AIR, OPS, PEL, AIG) | AOC AMO ATO ACV VATM | Level of implementation achieved through SSP Gap Analysis (iSTARS) Development of safety objectives Development of safety performance indicator Development of safety performance targets Establishment of MOR and VOR scheme by service providers Establishment of communication channel between CAAV and industry |
| Periodic review by Aviation Safety Risk Manangement Committee (ASRMC) SPI’s | |||
| b. Develop safety performance measurement methodologies, aligned with the regional safety metrics, using the established safety risk management process (GASP, SEI-18B) | 2026 | |||||||||
| c. Develop safety performance indicators and safety performance targets using the established safety risk management process (GASP, SEI-18C) | 2026 | |||||||||
| d. Ensure the establishment of mandatory safety reporting systems by service providers (GASP, SEI-18D) | 2025 | |||||||||
| e. Encourage establishment of voluntary safety reporting systems as part of service providers’ SMS (GASP, SEI-18E) | 2025 | |||||||||
| f. Promote safety awareness and two-way communication, sharing and exchange of information within the State’s aviation organizations and encourage sharing of safety information with industry within the State (GASP, SEI-18F) | 2026 | |||||||||
| SEI-3.7 Acquisition of resources to increase the proactive use of risk modelling capabilities (GASP, SEI-19) | a. Identify resources needed to support safety intelligence collection and processing, advanced data analysis, risk modelling and information-sharing capabilities (GASP, SEI-19A) | 2026 | CAAV (LEG, ORG, AGA, ANS, AIR, OPS, PEL, AIG) | AOC AMO ATO ACV VATM | Level of implementation achieved through SSP Gap Analysis (iSTARS) Establishment of HR policy Number of trained and qualified personnel on SSP/SMS |
| Periodic review by Aviation Safety Risk Manangement Committee (ASRMC) Training plan follow up | |||
| b. Attract, recruit, train, and retain qualified technical personnel to specialize in risk modelling (GASP, SEI-19B) | 2026 | |||||||||
| c. Ensure that the Civil Aviation Safety Inspector workforce is trained to perform safety oversight of service providers that have implemented SMS (GASP, SEI-19C) | 2025 | |||||||||
| SEI-3.8 Advancement of safety risk management at the national level (GASP, SEI-21) | a. Establish data sharing connectivity and integration among the State’s aviation safety databases, including the mandatory occurrences reporting system, voluntary safety reporting systems, safety audit reports and aviation system statistics (traffic counts, weather information, EI scores, etc.) | 2026 | CAAV (LEG, ORG, AGA, ANS, AIR, OPS, PEL, AIG) | AOC AMO ATO ACV VATM | Level of implementation achieved through SSP Gap Analysis (iSTARS) Establishment of safety data requirement /policy | High | Periodic review by Aviation Safety Risk Manangement Committee (ASRMC) | |||
| b. Develop risk modelling capabilities to support monitoring system safety issues and accident/incident prevention | 2026 | |||||||||
| c. Encourage information-sharing with industry | 2026 | |||||||||
On CE-1, CE-2, CE-5 and CE-8 (GASP, SEI-1D) and,
7.3 KEY REFERENCE DOCUMENTS USED TO DEVELOP THE NASP 2025-2028
[1] ICAO GASP 2023-2025 Edition (Doc 10004).
[2] Icao Manual on the Development of Regional and National Aviation Safety Plans 2022 Edition (Doc 10131).
[3] ICAO Global Aviation Safety Roadmap 2023-2025 Edition (Doc 10161).
[4] Icao Manual on Monitoring Implementation of Regional and National Aviation Safety Plans 2023 Edition (Doc 10162).
[5] ICAO Basic Building Block (BBB) Framework, October 2022.
[6] ICAO Annex 19 and consequential amendments to Annexes 1; 6 Parts I and III; and 13.
[7] ICAO Manual on human performance for regulators (Doc 10151) First edition 2021.
[8] ICAO World Civil Aviation Report, Volume 6, 2023 edition.
[9] AP-RASP 2023-2025 Edition.
[10] APAC Annual Safety Report 2022,2023,2024.
[11] Vietnam Aviation State Safety Programme 2013.
[12] EASA Artificial Intelligence Roadmap 2.0, May 2023.
- 1Chỉ thị 1027/CT-CHK năm 2025 tăng cường biện pháp bảo đảm an toàn hàng không do Cục Hàng không Việt Nam ban hành
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Quyết định 1050/QĐ-CHK năm 2025 về Kế hoạch an toàn hàng không quốc gia Việt Nam Giai đoạn 2025 - 2028 Phiên bản số 01 do Cục trưởng Cục Hàng không Việt Nam ban hành
- Số hiệu: 1050/QĐ-CHK
- Loại văn bản: Quyết định
- Ngày ban hành: 15/07/2025
- Nơi ban hành: Cục Hàng không Việt Nam
- Người ký: Hồ Minh Tấn
- Ngày công báo: Đang cập nhật
- Số công báo: Đang cập nhật
- Ngày hiệu lực: 15/07/2025
- Tình trạng hiệu lực: Kiểm tra